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 The difference between pure or basic science and applied science is
 that the former aims at understanding reality, while the latter endeav
 ors to improve it. Both represent intense goal-directed trouble-shoot
 ing activities; each constantly seeking to unearth, and subsequently to
 solve problems. But the types of problems they seek to solve are dif
 ferent. A pure, or basic scientific problem arises when a theory, an
 account of nature, is found in some sense inadequate; when science is
 thought to fail. A problem in applied science arises, on the other
 hand, when nature itself (as described by pure science) is found
 allegedly incapable of realizing certain practical objectives; when
 nature, rather than science, is thought to fail. Needless to say the two
 projects are closely related. The relationship, however, is not entirely
 symmetrical. Applied science provides valuable testing grounds for the
 claims and theories of pure science. But pure science is quite capable
 of flourishing even in areas devoid of practical applications. On the
 other hand, applied science is applied science. Devoid of theoretical
 insight, the applied scientist is blind.
 All of this is equally true of the philosophy of science. Most con
 temporary philosophy of science is 'basic', seeking primarily to
 describe and to understand science rather than to improve it. Pure or
 basic philosophy of science takes science as it finds it. It ponders its
 theory structures, its test procedures, the nature of its decisions, its
 language(s), its logic(s), its modes of reasoning, its institutional and
 communal life, the complexity of its relationship to its wider social,
 1 London: Routledge, 1989 (first published by Bgntam Books, 1987).
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 political and cultural context(s). It is seldom explicitly normative. For
 most professional philosophers of science, science is considered a
 curious and fascinating phenomenon demanding of explanation. Sci
 ence thus largely stands to basic philosophy as literature to literary
 theory or as music to musicology. Basic philosophy of science is ide
 ally an interpretative rather than a constitutive, or even a corrective
 enterprise. As in basic science, the type of problems raised and
 addressed by basic philosophy of science pertain to the shortcomings
 and apparent inadequacies discovered in its own second-order theo
 ries of sciences. Trouble-shooting is here also a reflective activity,
 directed primarily towards the self-improvement of philosophy. Basic
 philosophy of science, in short, seeks to expose and rectify apparent
 failures on behalf of philosophy to understand science rather than
 apparent failures of science to do its job.
 But not all philosophy of science 'basic'. Joseph Wayne Smith's Reason,
 Science and Paradox, to take one extreme example, urges philosophers of
 science to 'take up once more the enterprise of philosophia perennis.
 Rather than view philosophy as a merely curious bystander, or, worse, 'as
 a mere underlabourer of the sciences', writes Smith2 a 'metaphor involv
 ing prison guards poised with machine guns may be more appropriate'.
 The problems Smith undertakes to expose attest not to faulty second
 order philosophizing, but to alleged first-order scientific failure and con
 fusion. His aim as a philosopher is not merely to understand what scien
 tists are up to, so much to apply such undestanding in order to expose
 their apparent failures to achieve their own objectives. Smith's self
 appointed corrective philosophical project for the sciences is as thor
 oughly negative as it is antagonizing. 'Philosophy', he maintains 'Can be
 viewed as a sui generis knowledge producing enterprise in a number of
 respects, one of the most important being the establishment of essential
 ly negative results such as the contradictoriness of theories and the intel
 ligible limits of cognitive enterprise'.3 The concluding paragraph of his
 chapter on probability theory summarizes his approach: 'It is not my aim
 in this work to suggest new alternatives to defective positions, but mere
 ly to engage in a much needed slash-and-burn exercise. Perhaps from the
 ashes of this scepticism the search for a new non-probabilistic, non-for
 malist approach to the foundations of statistical inference m [a] y grow'.4
 The slashing and burning once completed, it is left to the now duly hum
 bled and closely invigilated scientist to attempt to put things right.
 2 J. W. Smith, Reason, Science and Paradox: Against Received Opinion in Science and Philosophy, Lon
 don/Sydney/Wolfeboro/New Hampshire, Croom Helm, 1986: 3.
 ^ Ibid.
 4 Loc. cit. p. 149.
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 David Bohm and David Peat's Science, Order & Creativity, is also a
 work of applied philosophy. Like Smith, they forcefully raise problems
 that attest to scientific rather than to philosophical failure. Their style
 and rhetoric is decisively less obnoxious, but their critique of science
 is equally devastating. Here, however, all resemblance between the
 two books ends. In fact, one could say that for Bohm and Peat,
 Smith's very undertaking is centrally symptomatic of the main prob
 lem that in their view besets science today. Science, Order & Creativi
 ty is not at all concerned with the conceptual coherence or logical
 consistency of this or that scientific theory. On the contrary, according
 to Bohm and Peat, the problem with science owes, at least in part, to
 a lack of playful conceptual and logical laxity on behalf of scientists.
 Science, they argue, has become conceptually rigidified to the point of
 fragmentation. The situation is so far gone, their book implies, that
 professional philosophy of science can no longer help. It is no longer
 a question of understanding science better for what it is, as basic phi
 losophy of science would have it, or of pointing aggressively, as does
 Smith, to conceptual or logical lapses in specific areas of scientific rea
 soning. For science to (re)take its place as 'the key to increasing
 progress and the betterment of life' (p. 15), they submit, it needs to
 be (re)rendered creative. In order to do so, they claim, science is
 required no less than 'to operate in a radically new way, in which fun
 damentally different ideas are considered together and new percep
 tions made between them' (p. 63). The problems divulged, analyzed
 and allegedly solved in Science, Order & Creativity are not scientific
 problems. They attest to a fundamental failure of science but not to
 scientific failure per se. Bohm and Peat's meta-scientific undertaking
 cannot afford, therefore, to remain negative. However, neither science
 itself nor current professional philosophy are capable of the radical
 positive rethinking required, in their view in order to restore and
 ensure scientific creativity.
 Bohm and Peat's prognosis for the sciences is bold, but perhaps not
 quite as radical as they make out. The truly radical critics of science,
 notably Bacon and Descartes in their time, and perhaps also Alfred
 North Whitehead in this century, called emphatically for the entire
 scientific enterprise to begin anew. Bohm and Peat do nothing of the
 sort. Their complaint hardly touches on the content of current scien
 tific theories. What they find deeply disturbing has little to do with
 what scientists actually say or even how they say it, but with the rigid
 ity by which their views are held and treated thereafter. In this respect
 Science Order & Creativity is a timely and thought-provoking book
 that raises a cluster of important philosophical problems seldom
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 addressed by philosophers. Its philosophical radicalism, however, even
 within its limited domain, is injustified. Their book is vexingly out of
 touch with much of latter-day history and philosophy of science, from
 which, as I shall argue, it might have greatly benefited in both its neg
 ative and positive claims. Written out of it as they are, it is none the
 less a book that professional philosophers should take seriously.
 The problems dealt with in Science Order & Creativity converge on
 what Bohm and Peat term 'the fragmentary approach of science to
 nature and reality' (p. 15). As opposed to the perfectly legitimate and
 natural division of an area of knowledge into particular fields of spe
 cialization, science, they submit, all too often exhibits a tendency 'to
 impose divisions in an arbitrary fashion, without regard for any wider
 context, even to the point of ignoring essential connections to the rest
 of the world' (pp. 15-16). While the first type of division normally
 reflects true scientific progress, the latter, they urge, is frequently
 detrimental, if not fatal to scientific advance. The difference between
 a natural and fruitful division of an area of knowledge and one which
 is arbitrary and fruitless is not sufficiently clarified by Bohm and Peat,
 but the general gist of their complaint is clear. Fruitful divisions nor
 mally result from the need to delve deeper into specific issues without
 losing sight of the larger picture. Scientists often chose to concentrate
 on specific aspects of a problem to the temporary deferment of oth
 ers. One does not have to endorse all of Nancy Cartwright's thesis as
 to 'how the laws of physics lie', for instance, to appreciate both the
 extent and value of self-consciously employed ceteris-paribus clauses in
 physics.5
 Fragmentation, by contrast, attests to a far more arbitrary, unreflec
 tive and prima facie unjustified bracketing off of major theoretical
 premises. More times than none, submit Bohm and Peat, such moves
 are symptomatic of a tacit 'defense-mechanism' that serves ad hoc to
 insulate the hard-core of today's scientific consensus by redirecting the
 thrust of seemingly problematic new findings to the periphery. And
 thus, although 'the modern mind' no longer considers the recognition
 of 'absolute truth' as a viable scientific objective, 'and scientists have
 become accustomed, at least tacitly, to accepting the need for unend
 ing change in their basic concepts', many of them continue 'to defend
 the tacit infrastructure of the whole of science with great energy' (24
 5). The result is lamentable. Novel insights tend to be automatically
 set aside, or at best relegated to the role of mere instrumental moves
 valued for their formal utiliy rather than for their conceptual content.
 ^ Ν. Cartwright, How the Laws of Physiucs Lie, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983, especially pp. 46-7.
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 True challenges to the consensus seldom receive a fair hearing. Regret
 tably, note Bohm and Peat, Kuhn's description of a paradigm-gov
 erned 'normal science' is true of much of today's physics.
 However, rather than treat Kuhn's widely read book as a disturbing
 diagnosis of the way scientific institutions are run, most scientists have
 come to accept it as the norm. Kuhn's model itself, one might say, now
 functions as a second-order paradigm, informing the interiorized self
 image of the modern scientific mind. 'Paradigms', write Bohm and Peat,
 especially after they have been established for some time, hold the consensual
 mind in a 'rut' requiring a revolution to escape from. Such excessive rigidity
 amounts to a kind of unconscious collusion, in which scientist unconsciously
 'play false together' in order to 'defend' the currently accepted bases of scientif
 ic research against perceptions of their inadequacy (p. 61).
 Bohm and Peat would have benefited at this point from Imre
 Lakatos's influential 'Methodology of Scientific Research Pro
 grammes', which, far more than Kuhn's seemingly detached descrip
 tion of normal science, endeavors to prescribe an outspokenly norma
 tive model of scientific research. Lakatos's model advocates (rather
 than merely points to) the existence of rigid 'hard cores' insulated by
 'protective belts' of 'auxiliary hypotheses' actively and deliberately
 defended, at times even, 'pig-headedly' by 'negative heuristics'
 designed intentionally to shield them from disconfirming findings.
 One important difference between Kuhn's and Lakatos's accounts of
 science would seem highly relevant to Bohm and Peat's concerns.
 While Kuhn depicts exemplar mature normal science as governed by
 a single paradigm, Lakatos envisions science at its best when different
 'research programmes' compete for the same ground. Though gov
 erned by different paradigms (as Kuhn would have it), Lakatos's com
 peting research programmes are not incommensurable, at least not in
 Paul Feyerabend's crippling sense of the term. Their accumulating
 track records, are comparable, according to Lakatos, regardless of
 whether or not the actual theories each of them generates are mutu
 ally translatable. Lakatos's second-order methodology (facilitating
 choice between rival programmes as opposed to first-order theory
 choice within a particular programme) is grounded upon an analysis
 and evaluation of what he loosely terms 'problem shifts'. A research
 programme is regarded 'progressive' and worth further pursuing, if
 the theories it generates remain over time a step ahead of the facts as
 it were; if they entail novel empirical predictions, of which some at
 least are later borne out by experience. Conversely, a programme will
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 be considered 'degenerative', and a candidate for the scrap heap, if
 over time its theories remain persistently a step behind the facts, hav
 ing repeatedly to accommodate new findings by ad hoc modifications.
 At first blush Lakatos's account seems to fare well with Bohm and
 Peat's main examples - e.g. the alternative to Newtonian mechanics
 suggested by the Hamilton-Jacobi theory which, in their opinion,
 never received a fair hearing despite it being at the time as 'progres
 sive' as Newton's better established approach, or Heisenberg's and
 Schrôdinger's contradictory though equally 'progressive' approaches
 to the quantum theory. In this respect Lakatos's model certainly seems
 a step up from Kuhn's. But Bohm and Peat's vision of scientific cre
 ativity aims at considerably more than the type of alleged second
 order pluralism granted by Lakatos. It makes little difference whether
 mutually exclusive paradigms are adopted in succession by the same
 community a là Kuhn, or entertained concurrently by different com
 munities a là Lakatos. In either case the paradigms in question will be
 equally entrenched and likewise rigidly defended. And the fact that
 Lakatos's model endeavors to provide rational criteria for paradigm
 choice is at best beside the point. The fact that two research pro
 grammes are conceived at any one time as mutually exclusive should
 not, in Bohm and Peat's view, inevitably lead to an either/or decision,
 nor even to a 'pig headed' decision to defer judgment temporarily for
 the sake of giving the currently less successful one a second chance.
 What is required, they urge, is for the same scientific community to
 be able tentatively to set aside the apparent contradictions between
 rival theories, and to seriously explore novel ways of playfully relating
 them through creative metaphor. Within Lakatos's framework trans
 programmatic trading and exchange is wholly confined to the level of
 empirical finding. Confirmed predictions of a progressive programme
 become the explanatory problems of its rival, now required to accom
 modate them theoretically. (And should it be found to do so repeat
 edly only by ad hoc modification, it will be ruled degenerating and
 eventually abandoned). Rival hard cores, as their name implies, remain
 for the Lakatosian, in principle, rigidly insulated, sheltered from criti
 cism and subsequently unmodified. Lakatos's philosophy of science
 encourages and fosters fragmentation almost as a matter of ideology.
 If the conservatism that characterizes the works of Kuhn and
 Lakatos (despite their differences) was indeed representative of the
 current consensus in philosophy of science, Bohm and Peat's radical
 ism would be justified. There is surely little sense in seeking the aid
 of a philosophical system in order to combat the very ideas it sanc
 tions or allegedly presupposes. But the Kuhn/Lakatos approach is not
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 representative of all current philosophy of science. Karl Popper's
 work stands in stark contrast to both the implied conservatism of
 Kuhnian normal science and the motivated conservatism of
 Lakatos's Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. Bohm
 and Peat's failure to appreciate the full force of Popper's innovative
 approach not only deprives their diagnosis of an important ally, but,
 as I shall argue shortly, renders questionable the main thrust of
 their prognosis.
 Bohm and Peat envisage a truly creative scientific community as a
 well-informed, knowledgeable and open-minded group of researchers
 playfully uncommited to any one theory. A creative community will
 encourage and reward the construction of bold new theories, prefer
 ably those that challenge the common view most profundly. As a mat
 ter of policy, such theories will be granted long periods of gestation,
 during which they are 'played true' in conjunction with their better
 established rivals.
 Fundamental ideas need to be sheltered for a while in a spirit of creative 'play'.
 This should be acknowledged within the scientific community as being a neces
 sary period in which the new idea can be discussed openly and refined... Theo
 ries need no longer be considered as rivals, and the problem of determining cri
 teria for choosing between them becomes less urgent. It is even possible that the
 same scientists may entertain several alternatives in the mind at once and engage
 in a free creative play to see if they can be related, perhaps through a creative
 metaphor (pp. 59-60).
 Underlying the methodology implied in Science, Order & Creativity
 is the idea best described as an attempt to redefine the nature of sci
 entific queries. If Ί\ and T2 are two partially co-referring and contra
 dictory theories, the first question to be asked should not be: how can
 we best determine which of them to retain and which to reject, but
 rather: whether it is possible to modify and adjust our fundamental
 concepts so as to retain them both. The very existence of a theory
 considered fundamentally at odds with the accepted view should first
 be regarded as a potential falsifier of whatever is thought to deem
 them incompatible. Our first reaction to theoretical disparity, argue
 Bohm and Peat, should be to suspend judgment, to doubt the dispar
 ity itself rather than to take it at face value and to act upon it. Per
 haps it is possible to view the situation anew in ways that render the
 incongruity but apparent. Bohm and Peat thus envision scientific cre
 ativity at play primarily at the deeper and fundamental level of sec
 ond-order metaphysical trans-theoretical conceptual schemes, rather
 than at the level of first-order operational theory. 'Science will flour
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 ish in a more creative way', they write, 'if it allows a diversity of dif
 ferent theories to flourish. When communication between these dif
 ferent points of view is free and open, so that a number of alternatives
 can be held together at the same time, then it is possible to make new
 creative perceptions within science'(p. 83). For Lakatos, by contrast,
 all metaphysics, properly considered within the realm of scientific
 contemplation, belongs within the hard core of particular research
 programmes - duly unquestioned, and actively sheltered from modifi
 cation. Popper's theory of science is on this point decidedly different
 from Lakatos's, and in important respects closer to Bohm and Peat's.
 In the face of problems no area of knowledge should be sheltered.
 And since apparent problems are our main, if not only real source of
 knowledge, the bolder the conjecture, the better.
 Bohm and Peat, however, limit their discussion, almost exclusively, to
 the problem of theory-choice (or suspension of choice). They largely
 ignore the more conventional areas of scientific trouble-shooting, such
 as those involved in the straightforward empirical testing, interpretation,
 or the mathematization of single theories, despite the fact that they
 undoubtedly represent the main bulk of day by day science. In a sense
 their omission is understandable. Such run-of-the-mill scientific
 research, conducted in the light of one particular theory, bears less
 directly perhaps on the problem of inter-or trans-theoretical fragmenta
 tion with which their book is primarily concerned. But then Science,
 Order & Creativity aspires to treat the wider and more general issue of
 scientific creativity. In this respect their omission is less understandable.
 Creative scientific thinking does not begin at, and is not confined
 to the research situations focused upon by Bohm and Peat, namely,
 those in which several alternative, seemingly incompatible though
 equally plausible theories are already available. Interesting as it may
 be to the philosopher, the current state of quantum mechanics, that
 furnishes their main case-study, is hardly typical. Moreover, by ignor
 ing the process(es) by which the various theoretical alternatives came
 to be proposed in the first place, even the partial picture of science
 they attempt to paint is considerably distorted. As they aptly note (p.
 101-2), there is usually more to a scientific theory than the observa
 tions it aspires to accommodate and the mathematical formalism it
 elects to don. Theories, proposed as explanations or interpretations or
 classificatory schémas of phenomena, normally premise and reflect, if
 only implicitly, deep metaphysical commitment6. However, scientific
 6 Cf. J. Agassi, Science and Society: Studies in the Sociology of Science, Reidel/Dordrecht/Boston/Lon
 don, 1981, Chapters 18, 19 and 21.
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 theories are seldom born of purely metaphysical deliberation. Rather,
 as Popper persistently urges, they are best described and treated as
 proposed solutions to scientific problems. And it is primarily qua solu
 tions to the problems they were initially intended to solve that theo
 ries enter scientific debate, including at the advanced level dealt with
 by Bohm-and Peat. However, when properly couched in the process
 es of problem-seeking and solving that initially begot them, alternative
 scientific theories are not as easily reconcilable as Bohm and Peat
 envisage, even from the point of view of a philosophy that fully
 endorses their basic anti-Kuhnian approach. This, in my opinion, is
 their most serious oversight, as well as an interesting problem in its
 own right. But to appreciate it as such, a little more needs to be said
 about the nature of scientific problems in general.
 Pursuing a staunch realist agenda, Popper himself, as is well
 known, limits scientific problems to empirical disconfirmation. A the
 ory is deemed scientifically problematic, according to Popper, if (and
 one is tempted to add: only if), in conjunction with backgound knowl
 edge, it logically entails predictions that are incompatible with what
 ever are considered the facts at the time. But it is doubtful whether
 this particular type of problem truly exhausts the full range of scien
 tific perplexity. Various theoretical proposals are frequently suggested
 and seriously entertained by scientists with a view to overcome a vari
 ety of 'non-Popperian' obstructions, ranging from conceptual impreci
 sion mathematical inelegance. And whether or not we happen to
 regard them as difficulties worth tending to is beside the point. I sug
 gest, therefore, to retain Popper's basic problem-oriented approach to
 science, but to treat the notion of a (scientific) problem far more gen
 erally.7
 A basic scientific theory may be broadly described as a particular
 type of goal-directed system; a structured conceptual scheme or model
 designed, depending on one's philosophical persuasion, as a means to
 describe, interpret, explain, formalize or efficiently classify certain class
 es of phenomena. (The list of course, may be extended at will). Such a
 system will be regarded problematic exactly if there exists a discrepan
 cy between what it is, in principle, capable of accomplishing and what
 it is desired, or expected to accomplish. Viewed thus, as disparities
 between the capacities and objectives of goal-directed systems, prob
 lems are rendered epistemically objective. A system may or may not be
 problematic regardless of anyone ever being aware of the fact. Subse
 quently, our accounts of problems may be true or mistaken, closer or
 1 Cf. M. Fisch, 'Towards a Rational Theory of Progress', Synthese, 99, 2 (May, 1994).
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 further from the truth. Broadly speaking, an apparently problematic
 system may be rendered less problematic in one of two ways: by
 either improving its performance in relation to its original goals - in
 which case the problem will be said to have been fully or partly
 solved - or by suitably modifyng its original goals - in which case the
 problem will be said to have been dissolved or mitigated. A scientific
 theory found incapable of accommodating the full range of phenome
 na to which it was originally meant to apply, for example, may be ren
 dered unproblematic by an appropriate restriction of its original
 domain of application (as, for example, the restriction of Newtonian
 mechanics to relatively low velocities). But we would not consider this
 a solution of the problem of accounting for the kinds of phenomena
 excluded by such a move. A rational inquirer will, therefore, normal
 ly opt for the second option only as last resort. Scientists should not
 compromise their theoretical objectives unless they are convinced (a)
 that the problems that beset the theory designed to attain them are
 insurmountable as it stands, and (b) that there exist good reasons for
 salvaging as much of the problematic theory as possible.
 Thus construed, science is rendered sufficiently multi-purposed to
 be regarded as problem-oriented in a manner acceptable to all. It pro
 gresses by persistent trouble-shooting, by contrived and ordered
 cycles of problem-seeking and problem-solving, geared to the continu
 ous amelioration of its theories, models, mathematical apparatuses and
 experimental set-ups, in relation to whatever objectives they are
 intended to achieve. Creativity is required in the course of both the
 problem-seeking and problem-solving phases of any scientific inquiry.
 Open-mindedness, and a capacity imaginatively to perceive familiar
 situations in new and different ways are as important to the effective
 disclosure of problems as they are to solving them. And in either case
 rigidity, excessive pre-commitment, the motivated or subliminally
 entrenchment of hard-cores or paradigms are all major hindrances -
 all of which would seem to sit comfortably with Bohm and Peat's
 emphatic critique of the paradigm-infested state of current scientific
 thinking, debate and communication. But it does not. Interestingly,
 the class of scientific problems that they discuss is not easily accom
 modated even by the liberal erotetic model of scientific progress out
 lined above.
 To view a basic scientific theory erotetically is to view it as both the
 product and subject of tenacious trouble-shooting. Basic scientific the
 ories, certainly complex highly mathematicized ones, such as those
 discussed in Science, Order & Creativity, are seldom born of idle
 curiosity. A certain amount of playful tinkering is definetely involved,
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 but for their larger part, they represent years of meticulous, convolut
 ed, stubborn, and, more times than none, frustrating hard work in the
 face of pressing problems. A new theory is normally prompted into
 existence, tested, modified and assessed in relation to problems found
 to beset its competitors and predecessors. At this stage it will be pre
 sented and upheld as a comparatively better option than its rivals -
 namely as a better means to the achievement of the goals it is expec
 ted to achieve. Once established as a serious contender, the focus of
 critical scrutiny will gradually turn inwards by both friends and foes -
 the former, in order to further improve it, the latter, with a view to
 expose it flaws in order to promote and improve their own alterna
 tives. Bohm and Peat are right in claiming that in 'Kuhnian' commu
 nities that are overly committed to a fundamental conceptual infra
 structure, this type of rivalry will inevitably lead to fragmentation. A
 novel theory that challenges the accepted conceptual scheme will be
 deemed problematic merely for doing so, its other qualities notwith
 standing. To cast their claim in erotetic terms, such communites
 assume apriori that adherence to the norm in this respect should be
 counted first and foremost among the desired goals of any new
 hypothesis. Failing to do so, novel conjectures will be rejected, or at
 best relegated to the role of a mere formal instruments thus blocking
 the possibility of ever creatively rethinking the science's tacit concep
 tual foundation. This is precisely the condemnable attitude Bohm and
 Peat dub 'playing false'. Within the type of 'Popperian' community
 described above, where, in principle, conservatism is not considered a
 virtue, nor hereticism problematic, there is no such danger. So that
 even if we grant Bohm and Peat their point that today much of sci
 ence is in fact tacitly conducted along conservative Kuhnian lines,
 their additional tacit assumption that all current philosophy of science
 is similarly disposed is simply wrong. In Science, Order & Creativity
 Popper's theory of science is briefly acknowledged only to be criti
 cized for laying excessive stress on falsifiability. Its effect on the infra
 structure of science, claim Bohm and Peat, has been not to stimulate,
 but rather to further 'discourage the mind from free play with ideas'
 (59). The (contrasting) approaches of Kuhn and Popper, they imply,
 combine, in the infrastructure of science, to stifle all chance of theo
 retical innovation. Even when proposed within the conservative con
 ceptual limits tolerated by the Kuhnians, Popper's influence on sci
 ence has been to imply that 'without the possibility of some immedi
 ate 'crucial experiment', [a new] theory is looked on as being 'just
 metaphysics' and without any particular importance for science' (Ibid).
 Bohm and Peat are undoubtedly better acquainted with the current
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 climate of opinion within physics than the present reviewer, so I shall
 not challenge the descriptive sections of their book. But the remedy
 they propose is a different story.
 Insofar as a theory is seriously proposed with a view to advance sci
 ence a step forward, it is born testable, at least with respect to its
 intended goals (which, as noted, may very different from those pro
 posed by Popper himself). But rather than insist that theories, how
 ever outlandish, be 'played true' - that they be taken at face value and
 rigorously examined to determine whether they are indeed capable of
 fulfilling their anticipated promise - Bohm and Peat contend that, in
 the interest of scientific creativity we are better off playing down the
 differences between them and their rivals. Faced with two incompati
 ble theories, the Kuhnian elects to reject the most outlandish one
 regardless of their relative success. The Popperian insists that neither
 of them be deemed problematic unless proven so in accord with their
 professed goals, which in any case should not include conformity to
 an apriori conceptual scheme. Bohm and Peat suggest, contrary to
 both schools of thought, that their evident disparity be thought of, in
 the first instance, as indicative of a potential deficiency on behalf of
 their shared conceptual foundation.
 The Popperian, in short, advocates setting aside all metaphysical
 commitment (unless challenged directly by new findings) and to play
 true at the level of theory. Bohm and Peat, by contrast, demand that
 we set aside first-order problems and rivalries, and play true at the
 level of metaphysical foundations. The two strategies are obviously at
 cross purposes (because to play true on one level requires playng false
 on the other, and vice versa), and cannot be jointly endorsed sim
 pliciter. On the other hand, neither party can easily ignore the con
 cerns of the other. The Popperian certainly objects to apriori concep
 tual insulation of any kind, and although Bohm and Peat steer wide
 of first order scientific research, it is hard to imagine that they deny
 it. They do not address the problem explicitly. Here and there their
 text seems to imply that they are aware of it and that they seek to
 avoid it by advocating a kind of 'Doublethink'. The recurring phrase
 they employ is 'unity within diversity' which may be taken to denote
 an ability playfully to move from one level to the other while per
 forming incredible acts of forgetting. This is extremely hard to con
 ceive, and in any event is not developed further.
 This is the interesting problem Science, Order & Creativity leaves us
 with. The need to meet the challenge of the conservatism inspired by
 the works of Kuhn, Lakatos and latter day relativist is an urgent one.
 Bohm and Peat, not sufficiently aware perhaps of the full range of
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 their philosophical adversaries, rightly and forcefully diagnose it as a
 real threat to the very prospect to scientific creativity. Paradoxically,
 the philosophical solution they propose is plagued by the type of frag
 mentation their book so aptly laments, remaining by the end of the
 day unnaturally disconnected from the larger part of scientific life.
 And as if to prove their prognosis, the fragmentary nature of their
 own analysis owes to a lack of attention on their behalf to an impor
 tant philosophical alternative - that of Karl Popper and his school.
 For them the problem requires attention but is considerably less
 acute. Popper himself aknowledges the importance of metaphysics for
 science, but largely ignores the possible feedback effect of science on
 metaphysics. Joseph Agassi tackles in head-on8 within a Popperian
 framework. Metaphysical systems, he argues, can interact with theories
 both ways prompting mutual revision when necessary. When a theory
 is modified in the face of a problem, it may require us to rethink our
 deeper conceptual frameworks, and vice versa. When creative thinking
 is induced by a truly open and critical attitude, it may well go all the
 way down to fundamentals. To do so there is no need for the type of
 motivated conceptual laxity advocated by Bohm and Peat.
 Despite its obvious shortcomings, Science, Order & Creativity is a
 valuable and timely book. The problems it raises intentionally and
 unitentionally are urgent ones. Its bold and detailed analyses and pro
 posals for the reform of the language of science, the running of sci
 entific institutions, and their implications for scientific research and
 teaching, are insightful and valuable. This is a book philosophers and
 scientists alike should take with utmost seriousness.
 8 J. Agassi, 'The Methodology of Research Projects: A Sketch', Science and Society: Studies in the Soci
 ology of Science (footnote 6), pp. 273-82, esp. § 6.
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